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between single cell loading, targeted
filling of a few cells, and staining of
complete populations using bulk load-
ing. The use of all these techniques—
alone or in combination—will provide
important steps toward the functional
characterization of local neural circuits
in the brain. Moreover, the simple
application to living animals might
facilitate novel imaging approaches
for optical recordings of neural activity
in awake, freely behaving animals.
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How does experience change representations of visual objects in the brain? Do cortical object rep-
resentations reflect category membership? In this issue of Neuron, Jiang et al. show that category
training leads to sharpening of neural responses in high-level visual cortex; in contrast, category
boundaries may be represented only in prefrontal cortex.In 350 BC, Aristotle asked: ‘‘What is
there’’? His answer is given in the title
of his book: Categories. Ever since,
philosophers and scientists have
asked how we carve the world into
distinct categories.
Two millennia later, neuroscientists
have begun to tackle this question
with methods Aristotle could not have
dreamt of. Using single-cell recording
and functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), they can ask: what
are the neural mechanisms that un-
derlie categorization, and visual per-
ception in general? The first steps in
answering this question were made
when, in the 1950s, David Hubel and
Torsten Wiesel began to elucidate theresponse properties of single neurons
in early visual cortical areas. Later, sci-
entists shifted their focus to more high-
level visual areas, such as inferotem-
poral cortex, where Bruce et al.
(1981) discovered single neurons that
respond selectively to complex object
categories like faces and hands. Most
recently, researchers have tackled the
central question of how cortical object
representations arise in the first place
and specifically how they may be
shaped by experience (Op de Beeck
et al., 2006; Baker et al., 2002).
In this issue of Neuron, Jiang et al.
(2007) report a study in which they
combine the old question about the
nature of categories with the con-Neuron 53,temporary neuroscientists’ question
about the origin of cortical object rep-
resentations. Inspired by previous
electrophysiological studies in mon-
keys (Freedman et al., 2001), they
ask: what are the neural mechanisms
that underlie the formation of visual
categories through experience? Spe-
cifically, does training sharpen neural
object representations? Further, is
neural sensitivity higher to differences
between stimuli belonging to different
categories compared to stimuli be-
longing to the same category?
In the new study, human partici-
pants were trained for an average of
5 hr to discriminate between two types
of cars. The cars came from a morphedMarch 15, 2007 ª2007 Elsevier Inc. 773
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and the category boundary was as-
signed arbitrarily, such that one stimu-
lus dimension was relevant for the
categorization task (an approach simi-
lar to that of Freedman et al., 2001).
Participants were presented with three
stimuli sequentially, and had to guess
which of the latter two belonged to
the same category as the first one,
and were given immediate feedback
about their performance. The partici-
pants accurately learned the two cate-
gories, and their classification perfor-
mance showed a sharp transition at
the category boundary.
To assess neural changes associ-
ated with visual experience of the car
stimuli, the participants’ brains were
scanned using fMRI before and after
training. The authors used an fMRI ad-
aptation paradigm; this technique is
based on the fact that if neural activity
in a given brain region is reduced
for the repeated presentation of the
same stimulus compared to presenta-
tion of two different stimuli, then that
region must be sensitive to the differ-
ence between those two stimuli.
Adaptation can thus be used as a mea-
sure of neural sensitivity or ‘‘tuning.’’
Jiang et al. presented pairs of stimuli
from their car set (in contrast to train-
ing, where stimuli were presented
three at a time). The two stimuli on
each trial were either the same or dif-
ferent, and the stimuli on ‘‘different’’
trials could belong to the same or dif-
ferent trained categories.
First, the authors focused their anal-
ysis on the lateral occipital area (LO),
an object-selective human brain re-
gion which may correspond approxi-
mately to monkey inferotemporal
cortex. Before category training, this
region was not sensitive to stimulus
differences: the response magnitude
to ‘‘different’’ stimulus pairs was no
larger than that for ‘‘same’’ pairs. How-
ever, after training, right LO showed
a higher response to ‘‘different’’ com-
pared to ‘‘same’’ stimulus pairs. Cru-
cially, the participants performed a
‘‘position-change’’ task during fMRI
scanning, which was unrelated to the
categorization task on which they
were trained, thus ruling out potential
task confounds. Thus, the authors774 Neuron 53, March 15, 2007 ª2007 Eldemonstrate for the first time with fMRI
in humans that visual experience with
particular stimuli for several days can
lead to increased neural sensitivity for
these stimuli in object-selective brain
regions, as measured by adaptation. A
putative underlying mechanism for
this finding is the sharpening of tuning
of object-selective neurons through
visual experience (Baker et al., 2002);
however, the indirect nature of the
fMRI BOLD signal requires that such
interpretations be stated with care.
Second, Jiang et al. asked whether
a neural correlate of categorical per-
ception could be found in LO: is the
fMRI signal higher on ‘‘different’’ trials
when the two stimuli belong to differ-
ent categories compared to when
they belong to the same category?
This effect would indicate categorical
object representations, such that
the neural representations of stimuli
belonging to the same category are
more similar than those of stimuli be-
longing to different categories. Criti-
cally, the stimulus pairs under compar-
ison were equidistant in the stimulus
space and matched for physical simi-
larity, thus avoiding low-level con-
founds. Interestingly, Jiang et al. found
no effect of category membership in
LO: the responses on ‘‘different’’ trials
after training were no higher when the
two stimuli came from opposite sides
of the category boundary than when
they did not. Thus, although object
representations in LO are refined by
visual experience, this study found
no evidence for a representation of
learned category structure in LO.
To further investigate effects of cat-
egory membership, the authors con-
ducted an additional fMRI experiment
in which participants were asked to
categorize the car stimuli during scan-
ning, in contrast to the first experiment
where the task had been independent
of category membership. With this
manipulation, Jiang et al. did obtain a
category membership effect: neural
activity in right lateral prefrontal cortex
(rLPFC) was higher for stimulus pairs
that belonged to different categories
than for equidistant pairs belonging
to the same category. The authors
conclude that this region is likely to
contain category-selective neurons.sevier Inc.Taken together, these results lend
weight to a model of perceptual learn-
ing according to which visual experi-
ence sharpens neuronal tuning of ob-
ject representations in inferotemporal
cortex, in a manner that is independent
of category membership and task; in
contrast, cells in prefrontal cortex are
tuned to the category membership of
the stimuli (Miller and Cohen, 2001).
Furthermore, the study confirms and
extends previous studies on the neural
basis of visual experience and catego-
rization in both monkeys (Freedman
et al., 2001) and humans (Op de Beeck
et al., 2006). Specifically, this is the first
fMRI study showing a sharpening of
‘‘tuning’’ in object-selective brain re-
gions through visual experience.
At the same time, the study poses
questions for future research. First,
Jiang et al. find no evidence of a cate-
gorical effect in high-level visual cor-
tex. However, the human object-selec-
tive region lateral occipital complex
(LOC) usually falls into two compo-
nents: a posterior and lateral portion,
LO, which Jiang et al. studied; and a
more anterior and medial portion,
pFs. The latter is commonly thought to
contain higher-level object represen-
tations than LO (Grill-Spector et al.,
2001), but could not be investigated
by Jiang et al. because it could not be
localized reliably in some participants.
The question arises whether this region
might have shown the category-spe-
cific effect that was not obtained in
LO; this would indicate that visual cat-
egories might be represented percep-
tually in high-level visual cortex rather
than only in the frontal lobe. The possi-
bility that pFs might show a categorical
effect is plausible given that other
authors (Rotshtein et al., 2005) have
found evidence for categorical repre-
sentations in the fusiform face area
(FFA), which borders on pFs.
Second, it is not entirely surprising
that Jiang et al. did not find a categori-
cal effect in high-level visual cortex
when one considers that they find no
behavioral evidence for categorical
perception: perceptual discriminability
of stimuli on opposite sides of the cat-
egory boundary after training was not
elevated compared to stimuli on the
same side of the boundary. This
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psychophysical categorization studies
(Goldstone, 1994) which do find im-
proved performance across the cate-
gory boundary after training. Future
research will need to address this dis-
crepancy. One possibility is that the
car stimuli used by Jiang et al. had
strong pre-existing representations
that could not be sufficiently altered
by category training to give rise to
such a category effect. It is possible
that the lack of a categorical effect in
high-level visual cortex can be ex-
plained by the lack of a behavioral ef-
fect, and one might hypothesize that
behavioral paradigms which lead to
such an effect would reveal a neural
categorical effect in LOC.
Third, the category-specific effect in
prefrontal cortex was only found when
participants were engaged in a catego-
rization task. This design confounds
the relevant stimulus conditions with
task performance: higher activity on
‘‘between-category’’ than ‘‘within-cat-
egory’’ trials could potentially reflect
general target detection as opposed
to categorization per se. Jiang et al.
argue against this alternative account
by showing that the magnitude of the
category effect in prefrontal cortex
correlates with accuracy in performing
the classification task across partici-
pants. Although this finding lends
some weight to the account that pre-
frontal cortex is in fact involved in cat-
egorization per se, a remaining caveat
is that incorrect trials were not ex-
cluded from this analysis, so the corre-
lation across subjects could also re-
flect general target detection.
Fourth, in Jiang et al.’s study, cate-
gories were determined by the experi-
menters: an arbitrary category bound-
ary was assigned along one of the
two physical stimulus dimensions, and
participants were taught the location
of this boundary with feedback. Thus,
this study addresses the effect of su-
pervised learning on category forma-
tion. In everyday life, this situation
can be likened to a parent teaching achild the difference between a cat
and a dog. A second form of category
learning, in contrast, is unsupervised
and stimulus driven. For instance,
phonemes are auditory categories
that are not taught, but nevertheless
show a categorical perception effect:
two sounds belonging to the same
phoneme category are perceived as
more similar than sounds belonging
to different phoneme categories, even
if physical similarities are equated (Lib-
erman et al., 1957). A remaining ques-
tion, therefore, is whether common or
distinct neural mechanisms underlie
these two forms of category learning.
Specifically, one might conjecture
that unsupervised category learning
is unlikely to be mediated by prefrontal
cortex, as seems to be the case for
supervised category learning; instead,
this form of learning might involve
category-specific changes in visual
areas.
A further question in this context is
which behavioral mechanisms drive
unsupervised category learning and
how they differ from those at work in
the paradigm of Jiang et al. One possi-
bility is that observers in unsupervised
paradigms form categories by exploit-
ing statistical regularities of the visual
environment (Fiser and Aslin, 2002).
For instance, it has been shown both
in the auditory (Maye et al., 2002) and
low-level visual domain (Rosenthal
et al., 2001) that stimuli with high rela-
tive frequency of occurrence become
category prototypes, whereas low-fre-
quency stimuli form category bound-
aries. However, questions remain:
does this effect also hold for complex,
object-like visual stimuli? If so, how
does frequency of occurrence interact
with physical stimulus attributes, and
does this type of unsupervised learn-
ing require active categorization or
merely visual exposure to the fre-
quency spectrum (Turk-Browne et al.,
2005)? Finally, do the representations
established through unsupervised
learning differ from those arising after
supervised learning?Neuron 53,The nature and origin of categories
has been debated since the times of
Aristotle, and the role of experience in
shaping cortical object representa-
tions is engaging modern neuroscien-
tists. The creative experiments by
Jiang et al. provide new insight into
these questions. Most importantly,
Jiang et al. show that experience
shapes cortical object representa-
tions: training on visual stimuli can
increase neural sensitivity in object-se-
lective brain regions. The exact mech-
anisms underlying these changes
remain to be elucidated; but Jiang
et al. have made an important step in
the right direction.
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